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Making a Nation in High Mountains: Balawars and 
Balawaristan Nationalism in Ghizer District of Gilgit Baltistan
Introduction
The words Balawaristan and Balawar are derived from a Persian word bala, 
meaning high; thus Balawar is someone who lives high up in the mountains, 
and Balawaristan is a place of heights (Sökefeld 1999: 354). These words have 
been coined to create a nation of the inhabitants of Gilgit Baltistan (GB), and 
to unite a diverse population on the basis of a shared geography, history and 
culture. These words do not have any historical background, though Balawar-
istan sounds familiar with Boloristan1, the historic name of areas around Gil-
git. Balawaristan is a classic example of what Benedict Anderson has termed 
‘Imagined Communities’ (Anderson 2006: 6). The name was formulated by 
Nawaz Khan Naji in 1988 and published for the first time in a pamphlet titled 
Balawaristan. Since then, the number of people who agree with the national-
ist discourse of Balawaristan has steadily risen. The Balawaristan discourse 
about GB contradicts the Pakistani state’s historical stance over GB. In the 
name of Balawaristan, activists challenge the Pakistan government’s control 
over their lives and geography. Officially, Pakistan considers these areas as 
parts of the larger territory of Jammu and Kashmir and links their fate with 
the resolution of the Kashmir dispute with India. The Balawaristan National 
Front (BNF), the party established by Nawaz Khan Naji in the name of Bala-
waristan, on the other hand, considers GB as a separate territory that ac-
commodates a separate nation. According to the BNF, these areas were not 
a legitimate part of Jammu and Kashmir; rather, Kashmir was controlling 
them by military power in collaboration with the British Crown. 
The BNF calls for an independent state named Balawaristan, compris-
ing the areas of GB plus districts of Kohistan and Chitral which are today 
part of Pakistan’s Province Khyber Pakhtunkhwa; and it also includes In-
dian controlled Ladakh. The movement believes in a peaceful struggle for 
the ultimate cause of a separate homeland for the inhabitants of these areas. 
Furthermore, the BNF has also struggled to highlight the demand that the 
people of GB should be given the right of determining their future in light 
of the long awaited plebiscite under the UN. Further, the BNF wants to be a 
fourth party in the Kashmir dispute; India, Pakistan and Kashmir being the 
other parties. In the current setup, the people of GB do not have representa-
1 “…Great Bolor is identical with present Baltistan, Little Bolor with the Gilgit 
upper valley” (Jettmar 1980: 6).
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tion in the national legislature of Pakistan. Using electoral politics, the BNF 
is attempting to mobilize the local people to make sense of their own identity 
in a situation where they are surrounded by India, Kashmir and Pakistan’s 
quest to take or to perpetuate control of the area. 
The by-elections of 2011 in Gilgit Baltistan for the Gilgit Baltistan Legis-
lative Assembly (GBLA) witnessed an exceptional win for BNF’s leader Nawaz 
Khan Naji in Ghizer, the most western district of GB. In the electoral ward 
Ghizer 1, Nawaz Khan Naji obtained 8.299 out of 27.817 registered votes; the 
turnout of the elections was 67% — the highest turnout in the electoral his-
tory of GB.2 The Pakistan People’s Party (PPP) had won all elections in this 
constituency since the abrogation of Frontier Crimes Regulation3 (FCR) in 
1974 by the then PPP Prime Minister Zulifqar Ali Bhutto. The victory of a na-
tionalist leader in Ghizer district paved the way for the nationalist movement 
to reach the masses in an unprecedented manner. Previously, the nationalist 
leaders in the area either remained aloof from electoral politics or secured 
very little votes in elections. The youth played a key role in mobilizing people 
to vote for the BNF, but also elders of the area supported the party by giving 
its candidate a chance to represent them in the GBLA. Along with the party 
vote, Nawaz Khan Naji also secured votes for his charismatic personality and 
being an active public figure.
Although the party is not officially banned, the BNF is vituperated by 
government authorities as an anti-Pakistan party. Previously, local people 
abstained from associating themselves with the party because it demanded a 
separate homeland for the people of Gilgit Baltistan. The strength of the BNF 
is the youth of GB that is getting education in down-country Pakistan, i.e. in 
Karachi, Lahore and Islamabad. Students coming from GB have formed the 
Balawaristan National Student Organization (BNSO) in these cities. Since 
GB was named Northern Areas of Pakistan before 2009, people living in the 
area felt the lack of a common identity when they came in contact with people 
from other parts of Pakistan as the designation “Northern Areas” denotes the 
geography of the area only in relation to Pakistan.
Founded in 1988 by Nawaz Khan Naji in Gilgit city, the party is now at-
tracting more and more people in Ghizer district as well as in other parts of 
Gilgit Baltistan. The party is divided into two main groups, yet both parts 
disseminate the same discourse of history and identity of Gilgit Baltistan 
that is also shared by other nationalist parties like the Karakoram National 
Movement (KNM). The two groups of Balawaristan employ different strate-
gies to achieve the ultimate target of freedom. The BNF Naji group believes 
2 Data obtained from the Election Commission of Pakistan’s office in Gilgit city. 
3 FCR was introduced by the British in India in 1901 to control the frontier 
districts of their Empire in order to benefit colonial power as it lacked basic 
democracy. In this set-up, a political agent runs virtually all the affairs of a 
district. Pakistan run the GB under this legal arrangement from 1947 to early 
1970s; local people call this kala qanun (black law).
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in a peaceful struggle based on negotiations with the states of India4 and 
Pakistan5 for the solution of the Kashmir problem, while the BNF Hamid 
group has earned a reputation in the area of being pro-India.6 Both groups 
are based in Ghizer, but the former group is strong in Punial and Gupis tah-
sils (subdistricts) of the district, while the latter has more support in the Ya-
sin valley. The BNF Hamid group is headed by Abdul Hamid Khan, who is in 
exile since 2001 and operates from Europe. Being absent from the area, he 
is blamed by local people for receiving foreign funds for the cause of Bala-
waristan. BNF Naji group is headed by Nawaz Khan Naji, who is considered 
a Quaid (leader, commander) by having earned the reputation of being an 
honest and dedicated politician. The success of nationalist leaders in Ghizer 
helped the Balawaristan movement to go beyond the accusation that nation-
alists are engaged in separatism, in anti-Pakistan and pro-India propaganda; 
it made people think of a Balawar identity not as ominous but as a new way 
to look at the history and geography of the area in secular terms and also to 
think of GB as a place of a shared political identity, rather than adopting a 
policy for or against Pakistan or any other neighboring country.
On 1st of November 1947, two and a half months after the inception of 
Pakistan, the local people of the ‘Gilgit Agency’7 fought for their accession 
with Pakistan against the Dogras (Rulers) of Kashmir in the name of Is-
lam. Still today, the 1st of November is celebrated as the day of freedom from 
Dogra, that is, Kashmiri, rule. These areas were virtually disconnected from 
the rest of Pakistan until the completion of the Karakorum Highway (KKH) 
in 1978. The construction of the KKH was a landmark for the strategic friend-
ship of Pakistan and China. The impact of this road on the lives of the people 
living in GB has been enormous.  
At the time of the opening of the Karakorum Highway, the Government 
of Pakistan published a pamphlet that claimed that this route would bring 
revolutionary changes to the Northern Areas, and that it would help to pro-
mote national integration of a kind heretofore unknown to the mountain-
locked inhabitants (Karakorum Highway pamphlet 1978, cited in Stellrecht 
1998: 7). The highway enabled the people of Gilgit Baltistan to interact with 
the people of khairo.8 Students from GB joined universities in Karachi, La-
hore, Peshawar, Rawalpindi and Islamabad for higher education. Many of 
4 India controls the territory of Ladakh. The BNF includes Ladakh in the 
imagined country of Balawaristan and claims to demand the area once the 
constitutional status of GB becomes clear.
5 Nawaz’s faction believes that Pakistan should be responsible for protecting 
the borders of the area, while all other rights belong to the local people. 
6 The Hamid group demands the complete separation of GB from Pakistan.
7 The British Gilgit Agency comprised the areas of Gilgit, Hunza, Ghizer and 
Chilas.
8 In Shina language khairo means “down”. The word is commonly used to refer 
to down-country Pakistan.
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them started businesses or took jobs in the big cities. Those who eventually 
returned to their home areas became aware of their peripheral identities and 
compared the under-development of their own area with the more developed 
regions in other parts of Pakistan. Returning students established different 
small movements in the region to acquaint the people with their political 
rights. They started to imagine a Nation of Balawaristan in the late 1980s 
(Sökefeld 1999). On the other hand, Pakistan penetrated the areas deeply 
through a web of roads; the state became a visible entity in the region through 
the construction of roads (Haines 2012: 8). For the government of Pakistan, 
these roads were important to connect with the geographically and strategi-
cally important region. Today, China’s wish to access the Gwader deepwater 
port on the coast of Baluchistan from its western provinces makes the KKH 
important for bilateral trade between Pakistan and China and for their long 
standing strategic friendship. 
Gilgit Baltistan has a long history of being controlled by foreign pow-
ers: The State of Jammu and Kashmir, the British and, since the partition of 
India, Pakistan is controlling the area. But there has always been a consid-
erable indigenous resistance against all colonial powers. The legend of Go-
har Aman,9 a ruler from Yasin who fought against the intruding Sikh and 
Kashmiri army, is still alive. The Punial Revolution of 195110 is an example 
in which local people were killed while demanding their rights. Today, many 
people of GB make efforts to claim their rights against the control of Pakistan 
over the region. The daily life of an individual in the area is replete with situa-
tions where he notices being ruled by others. People come in contact with the 
Pakistani state through the military and bureaucracy. All these organs of the 
state symbolize the holding of important powers by lowlanders and signify a 
sense of having no control over their own affairs among local people. 
The view of nationalists of Ghizer district on their area contrasts the 
Pakistani view. According to my respondents, to control the routes in the 
region has been more important for Pakistan than for the people of the area. 
It is evident that in the rest of Pakistan GB is perceived as a place that is geo-
graphically important because it is the gateway to China and home of some 
of the world’s highest mountains, and because tourists from all around the 
9  Gohar Aman was a famous warrior who belonged to the royal family of Chitral 
and became ruler of the Yasin valley from 1830 till 1860. He extended his rule 
from Yasin to Gilgit and is famous for his fight against Kashmiris in 1846. He 
is remembered as a hero by some nationalists in GB. He is also notorious as a 
cruel man who killed and sold many people of Gilgit into slavery. In his home 
town Yasin, he is part of local poetry and portrayed as a hero of the town in 
Gilgit city he enjoys both cruel and hero tags. He was a Sunni Muslim and 
people regard him anti Shia.
10 In 1951 people of Punial assembled at Singal village and protested against 
Raja Anwar Khan of Punial. They wanted to get rid of the Raja’s despotic rule. 
On the commands of the Raja, security officials opened fire on the crowd and 
killed seven of the protesters. Many others were arrested. 
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world come to see the region. Yet, information about GB provided in the rest 
of Pakistan by TV or newspapers does not include any knowledge about hu-
man beings living there. There are many travelogues about GB in Urdu11 avail-
able all over Pakistan. These books hardly speak about the people but rather 
about yaks, markhors,12 lakes and mountains. Hardly anyone13 in the Punjab, 
the largest province and center of power in Pakistan, knows about the lan-
guages and customs of the people of GB. Since the 1980s, another aspect of 
GB is becoming notorious in the rest of Pakistan: the Shia-Sunni conflict. Ac-
cording to the nationalists I interviewed, this conflict is linked to the increas-
ing control and presence of foreign powers, including the Pakistani state. GB 
and the rest of Pakistan are now linked through a web of roads, through the 
bureaucratic and military set up, and through mobile communication and 
TV. This interaction has resulted in the increasing realization of deprivation 
in GB as compared to the rest of Pakistan, particularly the Punjab. One of 
the students who studied in Karachi told me: “From Rawalpindi to Karachi 
I travel by train, and throughout the journey I see developed cities, factories 
and asphalt roads. These sights make me think of underdevelopment of my 
city Gahkuch.”
The nationalist discourse of Balawaristan and Balawar identity con-
tradicts the Pakistani state-driven discourse of identity. The Pakistani state 
gives primacy to religion as the basic marker of the nation’s identity (Jalal 
1995: 74). Furthermore, Ayesha Jalal states that “Proclaiming itself an Islam-
ic state created on the bedrock of a non-territorially defined Muslim nation or 
ummah, [Islamic Nation] the architects of Pakistan embraced the idea of the 
nation-state without conceding space to territorial nationalism in their of-
ficial ideology” (ibid.). The Balawaristan narrative, in contrast, unites all the 
sects and GB and envisages a state where religion is a matter of self-identity, 
rather than an identity imposed by the state apparatus. 
Religion, Army, Bureaucracy and GB in today’s Pakistan
Since the creation of Pakistan on the basis of the Two Nations Theory14 Is-
lam has been projected as the country’s raison d’être. The Islamic Republic 
11 The travelogues written by Mustansar Hussain Tarar are commonly read in 
down country. They represent GB as a land of fairies, lakes and high pastures. 
About the people, languages and customs these travelogues remain silent. 
12 A rare wild goat which is considered a national animal of Pakistan and also a 
symbol of Balawaristan.
13 I completed most of my education in the Punjab and do not remember 
reading anything about the people of GB in my school and college syllabus. I 
myself came to know about the people and languages of the area when I took 
admission in university and met fellow students from GB who told me about 
the diversity of languages in the area. 
14 The Two Nations theory refers to the idea that Hindus and Muslims in the 
Subcontinent form two different nations which cannot live together in the 
same state. 
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of Pakistan is united on the basis of its religion – Islam – though Moham-
mad Ali Jinnah, the founder of Pakistan, wanted to form a secular modern 
nation-state on the European model, as he said in a famous speech on 11th 
August 1947.15 Jinnah’s idea of Pakistan was soon overruled. A year after Jin-
nah’s death in 1948, the national assembly of Pakistan passed the so called 
“Objectives Resolution”16 which has remained part of the preamble of the 
constitution since drafted. The turbulent history of Pakistan is replete with 
events like the separation of East Pakistan and the emergence of Bangladesh 
as a sovereign country in 1971 that prove that Islamic identity alone was not 
enough to keep the diverse linguistic and ethnic groups under one umbrella. 
There have been many separatist nationalist movements like in Baluchistan, 
in Khyber Pakhtunkhwa or in Sindh that challenge the state’s narrative of a 
singular Islamic identity uniting all citizens of Pakistan. Although this proj-
ect has not been successful, Pakistan did not see much religious tension until 
1979, except riots against Ahmadis (Ahmad 2009: 20). It was Zia ul Haq’s 
dictatorial rule that made all efforts to Islamize the country and invoked 
the authority of the Objectives Resolution along with other Islamic clauses 
that had been introduced in Pakistan’s constitution of 1973 by Zulifqar Ali 
Bhutto. Islamization became the raison d’être of Zia’s regime and since then 
no government has been able to readdress the role of religion in national 
politics (Akhtar 2009: 23). GB is the only territorial unit of Pakistan that is 
dominated by Shias. Except for Diamer District all districts of GB are pre-
dominantly Shia. Shias are further divided into Ismailis (Sevener Shias) and 
Athna Ashari (Twelver Shias) in Gilgit Baltistan. 
Religious and sectarian identities in GB have become dominant since 
the 1980s when the Iranian revolution was at its peak and the Saudi Arabian 
government supported the establishment of madrassas across Pakistan in 
order to support Sunni Islam: “Support rendered by Iran, Saudi Arabia and 
some other Muslim countries to various Shiite and Sunni groups of Pakistan 
resulted into the outbreak of sectarian proxy war” (Ahmar 2006: 5). The fan-
ning of sectarianism in Pakistan in general and in GB in particular is linked 
with the Iranian and Saudi support to their respective groups. The USA and 
its allies wanted the ouster of the Soviet Union from Afghanistan, and Sunni 
madrassas (Islamic seminaries) in Pakistan funded by Saudi Arabia provid-
15 The crux of his speech is: You are free to go to your temples; you are free to go 
to your mosques or to any other place of worship in this State of Pakistan. You 
may belong to any religion or caste or creed that has nothing to do with the 
business of the State.
16 Summary of this is: Sovereignty over the entire universe belongs to God 
Almighty alone, and the authority which He has del egated to the State of 
Pakistan through its people for being practiced within confines prescribed by 
Him. Principles of democracy, freedom, equality, tolerance and social justice, 
as articulated by Islam shall be fully abided by. Muslims shall be enabled to 
order their lives in the individual and collective spheres in accord with the 
teaching and demands of Islam as listed in the Holy Qur’an and the Sunna.
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ed Jihadis (those who fight to defend Islam) against the Soviet Union. It is 
believed by nationalists in Ghizer district that General Zia Ul Haq supported 
Sunni Islam for the USA and Saudi Arabia’s interests; the former wanted Ji-
hadis and latter was against Shiites.
During Zia’s regime, also the Pakistan Army17 was Islamized and many 
generals and officers propagated the cause of Islam and Jihad (the struggle 
to defend Islam against non-Muslims). This shift in the Pakistani Military 
from a secular force to the arbitrators of a certain definition of Islam further 
fractured the country as a whole, and GB was no exception. The Pakistan 
Army is often considered the torch-bearer of a certain Islamic ideology. In 
1988, Shiite villages of Gilgit were attacked by thousands of Sunni tribes-
men from Diamer district and a mass murder of Shiites occurred around the 
villages of Gilgit. Shiite villages were burnt down; Sunni tribesmen contin-
ued killings for days and went unhindered by the Pakistan Army that was 
deployed not far away from the villages under attack. This incident is still 
fresh in memories of local people and nationalists believe that this onslaught 
was realized with the help of the Pakistan Army. They call Pakistani Army 
a Sunni army. For the Pakistan army GB’s importance lies in its geography 
as it borders directly with China, India, and Afghanistan and is close to the 
Central Asian states. A number of my respondents in GB praised the role 
of the more recent military dictator Musharraf. They claimed that since the 
area had always been seen as a strategic region by the army, it had received 
more development funds during military rule. The development work un-
dertaken in GB by the Musharraf regime was enormous. Many roads and 
bridges were constructed between 2000 and 2006. In Ghizer district alone 
there are 16.734 retired army men and the total number of “martyrs” in the 
district, who died while in military service, is 909. The Pakistan Army is 
the biggest employer for people of Ghizer.18 Retired army men bring money 
and establish businesses in Ghizer. Many retired army men are members of 
BNF and vote for nationalists. BNF activists believe that retired army men 
benefit the movement with their experience and exposure of down country. 
These roles of the army in the area make it ambivalent; its development of 
infrastructure increases the mobility between the villages and cities. Being 
the biggest employer for people in Ghizer, the army contributes to the local 
economy and reminds people of its institutional power.
The process to control GB by the state of Pakistan started with the ar-
rival of the Pakistani Political Agent in Gilgit. On 16 November 1947, Paki-
stan sent its Political Agent to the Gilgit Agency to take its control from lo-
cal people who had managed the Independent State of GB for fifteen days. 
The Political Agent was a Hazara named Sardar Mohammad Alam, and had 
17 For details on the different generations of Pakistan army and its Islamization 
see Cohen 2004: 97 to 130.
18 The record has been obtained from the Soldier Board office in Gahkuch by the 
author. 
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served as an Assistant Tehsildar (revenue officer) before. He was welcomed 
with great pomp and show as the people believed that the fruit of their free-
dom from Dogra and British rule had arrived, and that now they could live in 
freedom, being part of an Islamic state. Yet later it turned out that Pakistan 
officially considered GB a part of Jammu and Kashmir, and thus under the 
jurisdiction of Pakistan controlled Azad Kashmir. In 1949 the government of 
Pakistan formally took the control of GB by the notorious Karachi Agreement 
without consulting anybody from GB. The bureaucratic setup established by 
Pakistan was reformed to some extent when Bhutto abolished the FCR in 
the early 1970s. However, even today the Chief Secretary, the head of the 
administration of GB, is never a local man but rather a bureaucrat appointed 
from Islamabad. The same is the case with the Force Commander Northern 
Areas, the army commander in GB, and the Minister for Kashmir Affairs and 
Gilgit Baltistan, the federal minister who is responsible for GB. Local people 
started to challenge Pakistani domination in the early 1950s and established 
local parties like the Gilgit League in 1956 and the Tanzeem e Millat (Na-
tional Organization) in the late 1960s.
One event in Gilgit town in 197119 sparked protest against the adminis-
trative structure in GB and the arrogance of the Pakistani bureaucracy in the 
area. Many local people believe that after this uprising that the government 
in Islamabad sent many clerics to the area in order to divide the people over 
sectarian issues. Nationalists consider this strategy a new form of colonial-
ism. In 2009, through an ordinance, Pakistan renamed the Northern Areas 
of Pakistan as Gilgit Baltistan and upgraded the Northern Areas Legislative 
Council to the Gilgit Baltistan Legislative Assembly. For the first time, the 
people of the area had the right to indirectly elect their own Chief Minis-
ter. The GBLA consists of 33 members. The ordinance of 2009 gave GB a 
province-like status and gave the local people some control over the budget 
as well as the right to legislate on 61 subjects as long as legislation would not 
violate the constitution of Pakistan. It is interesting to note that GB is not 
mentioned in the constitution as a part of Pakistan. Consequentially, nation-
alists ask why legislation in GB has to be in accordance with this constitu-
tion if GB is not mentioned in the constitution. The process to control GB by 
Pakistan started in 1947 and since then many packages have been given to 
fulfill local peoples’ demands by Pakistan, but still the constitutional status 
of GB lingers and the resistance of locals to achieve a defined constitutional 
status continues.
In today’s Pakistan GB can be considered a colonized territory, as co-
lonialism did not end with the end of British control but rather changed its 
19 A local female school teacher was insulted by the wife of a Punjabi bureaucrat 
posted in Gilgit, and all the city got together to protest against this injustice. 
Many men were arrested for protesting and put in jail. Subsequently, local 
people attacked the jail and freed the men who had been arrested by security 
officials (see Sökefeld 1997: 284ff).
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form. This internal colonialism, where peripheral areas are totally dependent 
on the center without enjoying full political rights, is evident in many parts of 
Pakistan including GB (Sökefeld 2005: 970) and Baluchistan.
Identity Question and Nationalist Movements in GB
GB is home of diverse languages, ethnicities, sectarian and tribal identities. 
Different identities are claimed by people in different contexts, yet there is 
no singular identity that would unite them politically. Such an identity is 
proposed in the name of Balawar. Local identities like coming from a Raja 
family, Yeshkun or Shin tribes, speaking a particular language and sectarian 
affiliation were also significant, but being associated with Pakistan served as 
a unifying identity. Pakistan considered GB as ‘the other’, and tried to accom-
modate the area with the rest of Pakistan (Sökefeld 2010: 252). This endeavor 
of Pakistan is symbolized also by a replica of the Minar e Pakistan20 built on 
the main road in Gilgit. 
By now, many students, activists and businessmen write Balawar at the 
end of their name. By searching Balawar on Facebook page one can find 
hundreds of people from GB naming themselves accordingly.21 Balawar is 
sometimes also used as part of the name of a company.22 The trend of adopt-
ing Balawar as part of one’s name attracts people to inquire about this name 
and helps to spread the narrative of Balawaristan nationalism to a wider au-
dience.
Manuel Castells (2010: 8) distinguishes three categories of collective 
identity that can be utilized to understand Balawar identity: legitimizing 
identity, resistance identity and project identity. A legitimizing identity is 
created by governing institutions in order to justify their domination. This 
applies to Pakistani identity in GB. A resistance identity is authored by those 
who are in a certain position of authority but who are devalued by others. 
Sectarian identities in GB can be considered as resistance identities. A proj-
ect identity is a novice identity assumed by actors in order to construe their 
role in society and to propose social change. Balawar identity can be under-
stood as a project identity. It opens an arena for political struggle and allows 
imagining GB as an independent state. 
The Balawaristan movement has created a Balawar identity in Ghizer 
and Gilgit first. It is more popular in Ghizer than in other districts of GB, 
20 It is a National monument of Pakistan built in Lahore to remember the 
Pakistan Resolution of 1940.
21 https://www.facebook.com/search/more/?q=Balawar&sid=0.47190988874953177 
(visited on 16-11-2013)
22 There is Balawar Autos in the main bazaar of Gilgit and the proprietor is 
proud of the name of his shop. Balawar Traders, Balawar Net Cafe are in the 
main bazar of Gahkuch bazar. In Ghizer district, the flag of Balawaristan on 
back number plates of motorcycles is a common sight.
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yet in all districts some people identify themselves as Balawar, along with 
their other identities. In everyday discourse of the people of Ghizer, Diamer 
district is considered the most backward and rigid district, but in 2010 BNF 
has opened an office even in Chilas, the capital of Diamer.  The BNF plans to 
contest elections in 2014 from Diamer as well. The presence of multiple indi-
vidual and group identities in GB is described as a ‘multiplicity of intersect-
ing differences’ which are derived from religion, migration, locality, descent 
or other affiliations (Sökefeld 2010: 254). In this framework there is always 
a place for a new identity at a historical juncture (ibid.). Starting from 1840, 
historical periods of authority over local people of GB by Kashmir, British 
crown and Pakistan can be termed as colonial legacy.23 Balawar identity is a 
product of the periods described above; it is not a reactionary identity but a 
pivot on which a new social structure for GB is being constructed. 
Balawars and Balawaristan movement in Ghizer District
From 2001, BNF shifted its focus from Gilgit to Ghizer in order to participate 
in local elections. This was a big shift in the strategy of BNF to engage local 
people not on the grounds of anti-Pakistan slogans, but to disseminate the 
Balawaristan narrative among people through elections, and day to day in-
teraction in a manner that is acceptable for all. Till 2001, considerable num-
bers of students had returned from Karachi, Lahore and Peshawar to work 
in Gahkuch, the headquarter of Ghizer district, as lawyers, journalists, busi-
nessmen, as employees of NGOs or as government servants. These people 
were part of the Balawaristan National Students Organization (BNSO) in 
the institutions of higher education in down country Pakistan. Gahkuch is 
a promising town with ambitions for future development. Due to sectarian 
conflicts in Gilgit and its proximity to Gilgit this town is growing quickly; 
there is a visible migration to Gahkuch from all over GB. The town is also 
situated on the way to the proposed road to the Central Asian states and the 
construction of that road would bring it to prominence just as the KKH did 
with Hunza. 
In 2004, Hashim Khan, a BNF candidate from Damas village, won the 
seat of the chairman of the district council for five years. Yet nationalists do 
not so much see elections in terms of losing or winning as for them elections 
provide a platform to spread the Balawaristan-ideology to all and sundry. 
BNF-activists told: “We use elections to strengthen our membership and to 
spread our ideas.” Hashim Khan narrated that during his tenure the BNF ac-
23 These periods of dominance have been describes by various scholars 
chronologically like, a) Kashmiri dominated phase between 1840 and 1890, 
b) British dominated period between 1890 and 1947, c) the period of Pakistani 
independence starting in 1947 (Stellrecht: 1997: 5, Cultural Area Karakoram 
Scientific Studies, Vol. 3). With little changes, Sökefeld 2005: 944 also lists 
these periods of dominance.
135
EthnoScr ipts
tivists used all their links and powers for the movement. He said: “Since our 
leadership and members come from middle or working class, we are always 
running short of opportunities to enhance our strength.”
The leadership of the movement challenges control of politics by reli-
gious and rich people in Ghizer district in speeches and day to day discus-
sions. In 2004 there were also elections for the Northern Areas Legislative 
Council. Nawaz Khan Naji contested the elections against Pir24 Karam Ali 
Shah. During his speeches Naji repeated what the BNF had been telling peo-
ple for many years: “My opponent candidate belongs to the 2% of elite class 
in our area; I represent the 98% of the masses as I am a poor man myself. I 
respect the religious position of the Pir, but I do not accept his monopoly in 
the political field, and to end his monopoly in politics, I shall keep on con-
tending him. We [Balawars] talk about the identity and a nation of Northern 
Areas, we want to raise a young leadership of the area to bring young blood 
into politics, our problems won’t be solved by kissing the Pir’s hand, I request 
the elders of Ghizer district [to understand] that it is absolutely not a sin to 
vote against Pir, you will not be sinful if you do not vote for him. I do not 
agree with his authority as he materializes his religious status to get votes. 
And, people of the area, be aware that the time is not far when women of our 
area would contest elections against these religious people.”25 
If one spends a day in Gahkuch by simply walking and taking food from 
the local restaurants, the presence of BNF, BNSO, and Balawars becomes 
visible. Many cars and motor-cycles bear slogans, flags, and pictures related 
to the Balawaristan movement. Ghizer has now become synonymous with 
the Balawaristan struggle in entire GB. The road from Gilgit to Ghizer is re-
plete with slogans in favor of Balawaristan and its leadership. During my 
stay in Ghizer I met Khadim Hussain who teaches in a local private school. 
He narrated that it was a usual practice in school to ask tenth grade students 
to write an essay on a favorite personality. He said: “In the last couple of 
years we observed a new trend has started where students write about Nawaz 
Naji and other local nationalists. Before this it was common that everyone 
would reproduce essays from books about Jinnah, Allama Iqbal or others 
from Pakistan.” Jamil Balawar is one of those young people who managed 
the BNSO in Karachi between the years 2000 and 2005. As he came from 
Punial, he returned to Gahkuch and two years ago he started to run a hotel 
in the main bazaar of Gahkuch. His hotel is always full of customers. Since he 
is local and Balawars sit here, eat and drink, this place has become a hub of 
nationalists where they talk politics and plan for protests. In Pakistani hotels 
it is sometimes written on the wall that “yahan siyasi guftagu mana hai” 
(political discussions are prohibited here). He has written instead: “yahan 
siyasi guftagu pe pabandi nahin hai” (political discussions are not prohib-
24 Pir is an honorary title for a religious leader.
25 Weekly K2, 13 October, 2004, translated from Urdu by the author.
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ited here). Jamil holds a Masters’ degree in Management from Karachi, but 
he does not want to go for a job as he prefers his own business over serving 
the Pakistani state or being part of any NGO which in his opinion keep people 
busy and depoliticize them and make young people familiar with a foreign 
culture rather than their local one.
Hermann Kreutzmann writes that the Balawaristan movement is lim-
ited to Gilgit (Kreutzmann 2008: 213). He rightly points out that Indian dip-
lomats and scholars have exploited the term Balawaristan for their own pur-
poses. He further emphasizes that the Internet has played a role in spreading 
this name, giving it a presence in virtual space that is not matched in real life. 
According to my observation, however, this is only partly correct because 
the Balawaristan movement has undergone divisions. Only the Hamid fac-
tion is notorious for having links with and receiving funds from India. The 
Naji group on the other hand is considered indigenous and having no links 
with India. Kreutzmann is also mistaken in associating the popularity of the 
movement with Gilgit only. Although the movement was established in Gilgit, 
it is most popular in Ghizer district where nationalists contested elections for 
a decade now. Nationalists in Ghizer have been contesting elections for local 
bodies since 2004 and we saw that one of them became Chairman of the dis-
trict council of Ghizer. Kreutzmann also seems to underestimate the power 
that social media networks have achieved in these days. The Internet has 
become an important tool to spread ideas that the controlling authorities try 
to suppress. It has now become a cliché that nationalist, feminist and identity 
movements across the globe rely mostly on the new social media like Internet 
and mobile phone. The sociologist Manuel Castells has written much about 
identity movements. According to him, the Internet and mobile phones have 
converted the world into “network society”. In a new edition of his work on 
identity he writes: “Along with the technological revolution, the transforma-
tion of capitalism, and the demise of statism, we have experienced, in the 
past twenty-five years, the widespread surge of powerful expressions of col-
lective identity that challenge globalization and cosmopolitanism on behalf 
of cultural singularity and people’s control over their lives and environment” 
(Castells 2010: 2). For the nationalists of Gilgit Baltistan, the Internet has 
emerged as a space where no money and effort is needed to publish and cir-
culate the literature; they just upload and let others know. 
Emotions and Balawaristan movement: The case of Sher Qila village
Emotions have their place in political struggles; they evolve from constant 
attachment to a movement and from events that take place during the time 
of attachment. When I entered Sher Qila village for the first time during my 
fieldwork, I noticed a grave with a BNF flag hoisted over it. I read shaheed 
(martyr) on the gravestone and the date of death and I was shocked to note 
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that the deceased was a teenager activist of the BNSO who was killed by the 
security forces. This sent a chilling air all around my body. On 22nd Decem-
ber 2009, during elections in Ghizer, an eighteen years young activist of the 
BNSO was murdered by Police and Rangers in Sher Qila.26 This terrible event 
united the whole of Punial against the forces who had committed this heinous 
crime. The Gilgit-Chitral road was blocked for many days and widespread 
protests took place in every village of Punial. In the chilling cold of winter, 
men, women and children blocked the road and protested in solidarity with 
the BNF and the victim’s family. According to local people and newspapers 
people from Sher Qila were protesting on that day against unofficial election 
results and alleged vote-rigging when police and rangers opened fire killing 
one young boy and injuring two others. 
The death of this young boy is never forgotten. Every year on his death 
anniversary BNSO arranges an event to remember him and to pay tribute to 
the sacrifice of Shaheed Zubair. This event is attended by most of the villagers 
and an air of sadness, anguish and high spirit prevails during the commemo-
ration. It has become a public political ritual where activists take inspira-
tion and vow their commitment with the cause of Balawaristan. According to 
Mabel Berezin, “public political rituals serve as arenas of identity, bounded 
spaces, where collective national selfhood is enacted” (Berezin 2001: 93). She 
further observes that repetitions in experience of ritual participation cre-
ate a feeling of commonness among participants, and it develops collective 
memory (ibid.).
I stayed for a week with a family in Sher Qila. The family was divided 
about Balawaristan. The wife was a supporter of Naji but the husband had 
been an activist of ruling PPP for many years. The woman, who was educat-
ed, emphasized that Naji talked in a way that even her illiterate mother un-
derstood, while other politicians talked just for the purpose of getting votes. 
“Naji is one of us”, she said. The emotions connected with the BNF had taken 
it beyond the mere politics of votes. Rather, people have started to foresee a 
future in which they can control their resources and make their own political 
decisions. The woman of the family once stated while preparing breakfast for 
me and her husband: “People come here from all over the world and tell us 
that we are living in heaven, it is so beautiful and serene here. I like to imag-
ine that when my son is as old as you are, he lives in a place where we have all 
the rights and opportunities of the ‘heaven’ we live in.”
Conclusion
This article offered a view on the Balawaristan movement and the rising 
Balawar identity. The Balawaristan movement and Balawar identity have 
26 http://pamirtimes.net/2009/12/22/%E2%80%9Can-activist-of-bnf-killed-
two-seriously-injured-in-sher-qillah-post-polling-riots%E2%80%9D/. 
Accessed on May 23, 2013.
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achieved a level where they are accepted among the people of Ghizer and 
other districts of GB. They have entered the day to day discussions of many 
people. The Balawars are trying to expand their space by going for elections, 
jobs and businesses. The arrival of new media of communication in the shape 
of Internet and mobile phone access has opened new ways to spread their 
messages. During my fieldwork I often listened to speeches of nationalist 
leaders stored in people’s mobiles and received many text messages from ac-
tivists. These text messages clearly suggested that the new networks are help-
ing nationalists to communicate their ideas. Nationalists struggled to publish 
and distribute their literature under the surveillance of security agencies. 
Pakistan’s policies seem confused over GB: On one hand it links GB’s fu-
ture with the solution of the Kashmir dispute, but on the other hand Pakistan 
is trying to integrate this area by different packages since 1974 as a part of 
the Pakistani nation. Interestingly, the Supreme Court of Pakistan in its 1999 
decree demanded that people of the area were given all the rights enjoyed 
by the other citizens of Pakistan, emphasizing that the “people of Northern 
Areas are citizens of Pakistan, for all intents and purposes.”27 The Balawar-
istan struggle makes an effort to bring these areas out of the confusing status 
given by Pakistan, making it clear that these areas belong to the people who 
inhabit them and who should have the right to decide about their own lives 
and future. 
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